Challenging the notion of Fortress Europe, the BORDERLANDS research project investigates relations between the European Union and the states of North Africa and the Mediterranean Middle East (MENA) through the concept of borderlands. This concept emphasises the disaggregation of the triple function of borders demarcating state territory, authority, and national identity inherent in the Westphalian model of statehood. The project explores the complex and differentiated process by which the EU extends its unbundled functional and legal borders and exports its rules and practices to MENA states, thereby transforming that area into borderlands. They are connected to the European core through various border regimes, governance patterns, and the selective outsourcing of some EU border control duties.
Introduction

1
The European Union (EU) has been trying for decades to integrate the states of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) into the models and practices of its migration management. However, until recently, the EU has been unsuccessful in concluding readmission agreements regulating the return of people 'irregularly' residing in the EU, or in obtaining their full cooperation on border management. Attempts to formalize arrangements between FRONTEX, the EU's border agency, and MENA countries have been even less fruitful. In addition to resisting EU pressure, some MENA states even succeeded in taking advantage of the EU's preoccupation with migration, accepting aid, without offering any substantial concessions. Morocco, but also Libya under Qaddafi, are particularly good examples, 2 showing that unequal power relations do not automatically guarantee the smooth imposition of EU policies on the states on its periphery. This situation changed, however, following the start of the Arab uprisings in late 2010 and early 2011. Declaring that the 'European Union has a proud tradition of supporting countries in transition from autocratic regimes to democracies' 3 , Brussels formulated a 'new' response to the changing conditions in its southern vicinity shortly after the start of the uprisings. The adequacy of this 'new' policy has been extensively analysed in the literature, with many authors remaining sceptical as to whether the policy is really new. 4 Significantly, however, both Morocco and Tunisia concluded so-called Mobility Partnerships with the EU relatively soon afterwards, with Rabat signing the document on 7 June 2013, and Tunisia signing a draft Mobility Partnership on 18 November 2013 and the full Joint Declaration on the Mobility Partnership on 3 March 2014. 5 In addition to cooperation on border management, i.e. preventing unwanted migration to Europe, these agreements oblige the governments in Rabat and Tunis to 'readmit' Moroccan and Tunisian nationals residing irregularly in the EU. The Moroccan and Tunisian governments would thus cooperate with Brussels in the expulsion of undocumented Moroccan and Tunisian migrants. Importantly, these agreements also cover third-country nationals who entered EU member states through Moroccan or Tunisian exit points. In return for this cooperation, the visa facilitations offered by the EU under the Mobility Partnership for businesspeople and students from the two countries are relatively modest. 6 We argue that the new political context created by the Arab uprisings is the key variable explaining the sudden cooperation of Morocco and Tunisia with the European Union on migration control after 2011. This new context placed the Moroccan and Tunisian governments in a particularly vulnerable situation, thus allowing the EU to exert a greater pressure on its southern partners, under the cover of a redesigned policy: a policy (allegedly) meant to respond to the desire for democracy in the periphery. Thus, by exploiting the unprecedented fragility of the governments in the periphery, the EU embedded an interest-driven policy within a discourse of supporting democratisation, thereby reasserting the Union's allegedly normative international identity and its self-perception as a 'normative power'. In this regard, Brussels clearly increased its assertiveness, adopting a strategy that relies on the principles 1 Research for this paper was conducted in the framework of the BORDERLANDS Project, funded by the European Research Council under grant agreement number 263277. The project is directed by Raffaella A. Del Sarto and hosted at the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Florence. The authors would like to thank Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Asli Selin Okyay and an anonymous referee for comments on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as Julie Northey for language-editing. 2 On Libya see Paoletti, 2011. 3 European Commission, 2011a: 2. 4 Schumacher, 2011; Tocci and Cassarino, 2011; Teti, 2012; Bicchi, 2013. 5 European Commission, 2014. 6 On the imbalanced nature of the EU's Mobility Partnerships, see Limam, 2013. of 'normative framing', 'reverse conditionality', and the linkage between the issues of democratic reforms, cooperation on migration, and EU support, as discussed further below.
Values, interests, and the strategic use of norms
In conceptual terms, the case considered here is significant for two reasons. First, it is a clear example of how the EU adjusts its behaviour according to the specific context of each situation. Second, it is a case of an instrumental use of norms and values in the EU's external relations. The case under consideration thus adds to our understanding on the EU's international role and the impact of its foreign policy on third countries, as well as to the persistent debates in the literature on this matter.
Discussions on the nature of the EU and its foreign policy are marked by skilful attempts to delimit the conceptual framework, defining Europe as either a realist or a normative power. Competing concepts describe the EU as a soft power, a functionalist power, a trade power, a market power, or as an empire.
7 Concurrently, the 'normative power Europe' concept as coined by Ian Manners 8 has remained surprisingly resilient.
9 While the concept is to a large part an ideological construct, as convincingly argued by Cebeci, 10 there have been numerous attempts to qualify the notion, 11 with for instance Manners himself arguing more recently that both interest-driven and normative aspects characterise the EU's international behaviour.
12
Indeed, a focus on the EU's relationship with its southern periphery evidences that the EU has employed a panoply of tools and strategies; this does not allow us to classify the EU's approach as a purely realist or normative one. In order to achieve its goals related to security, migration and trade in particular, the EU and its member states have regularly used leverage and coercion. In the broader context of EU-MENA relations, however, the EU usually proceeds through a combination of both realist and normative policies. Indeed, all the instruments adopted under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Barcelona Process, with its Association Agreements, were and still are structured simultaneously on both coercion/conditionality and norms diffusion. Regarding the latter, it is significant that over decades of cooperation with its southern partners, the EU has been exporting its rules and practices to these countries through various cooperation and capacity building programmes.
13
The EU has thus clearly acted in a normative way, although this way of 'being normative' may not correspond to what Manners originally had in mind.
14 Thus, this paper confirms that the EU combines and/or selects what it considers as efficient means to attain its goals and serve its interests, to the extent that it sometimes sacrifices the values that are central to its identity. This is the case when the EU remains silent concerning human rights violations or supports authoritarian regimes in its neighbourhood, as it has been doing for years.
Exporting norms and practices depends of course on the interaction with the receiver. It also depends on context. As Wendt has put it, '[a]ctors do not have a "portfolio" of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining a situation.'
15 Hence, when considering the EU as either a realist or as a normative power, the dispute in the literature has clearly been operating within a false dichotomy.
16
The question remains, however, as to how norms and a specific order of interests interlock in concrete cases. While Diez highlighted the crucial role played by the normative power concept in the construction of the EU's identity, 17 it is evident that EU interests reflect the history and raison d'ȇtre of the Union, as constructivist accounts would have it. This explains why, at the rhetorical level, the EU gives top priority to the spreading of stability, prosperity, and democracy beyond EU borders. The Barcelona Process (or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) and the ENP reproduce exactly this type of discourse and rationale in their key documents.
18 While a profound discrepancy between EU rhetoric and policies towards the southern periphery has been observed for years, 19 there is yet another option of considering how norms may relate to interests. The case under consideration is an example of a conspicuously strategic use of EU norms. Assuming, of course, that EU foreign policy is the result of a complex interaction between different actors and procedures, the pressure exerted on Morocco and Tunisia as regards migration policies shows that the Union has advanced its interests under the cover of EU values. At the same time, and in return, the normative discourse is beneficial to the construction of an (allegedly) normative identity.
In the following sections, we will highlight the manner in which Brussels exploited the new political situation in Morocco and Tunisia following the events of 2011. The popular calls for liberty and dignity in the MENA region allowed the EU to frame its policy in normative terms, while it simultaneously pushed Morocco and Tunisia to accept a key instrument of its migration policy, namely the Mobility Partnership. The example also shows that the relationship between the EU, representing the hegemonic centre, and its periphery cannot be assessed without taking into account the specific context of the interaction. The importance of the 'situated interaction' between actors is of relevance to an understanding of how the EU changes the hierarchy of its interests, and how this in turn leads to an adjustment within its 'normative' identity.
Taking advantage of the fragility of Morocco and Tunisia
Morocco and Tunisia resisted pressure from the EU to sign a readmission agreement for some considerable time. Indeed, negotiations on a readmission agreement with Morocco were suspended after their fifteenth round in 2010, whereas Tunisia never agreed even to open negotiations on this issue. 20 Their acceptance of a largely uneven Mobility Partnership 21 in 2013 came at a crucial time in their political history. While Morocco and Tunisia have not experienced the same developments, it remains true that the two countries have been deeply affected by the political upheavals that have swept through the MENA region since late December 2010 -January 2011.
In Morocco, King Mohamed VI was quick to announce reforms to contain the rise of the February 20 Movement, which led a large protest movement. In Tunisia, the popular protests resulted in the departure of the long-time authoritarian ruler Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali. Both countries subsequently entered into a phase of unprecedented political instability and vulnerability, in which the EU offered 15 Wendt, 1992: 398. 16 Del Sarto, 2015. 17 Diez, 2005. 18 Barcelona Declaration, 1995; European Commission, 2004. 19 See for example Tocci, 2008; Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2011. 20 Interviews with officials from the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirm that the Tunisian authorities preferred negotiating readmission agreements separately with EU member states rather than with the EU as a whole, as this gave them a better bargaining position. 21 For the origin of the mobility partnership and its development, see Cassarino (2010) : 34 ff. extensive financial support for democratic transition, but also exerted exceptional diplomatic pressure on them to sign up to a Mobility Partnership.
As for Morocco, the year 2011 was marked by major political developments. Reflecting the aspirations of Moroccan society, the February 20 Movement (M20) took the lead in calling for a 'democratic constitution to be drafted by an elected Constituent Assembly representing, thus, the real will of the people'. 22 To calm the situation, in February 2011 the regime established an Economic and Social Council (CES). In early March, it ordered the transforming of the Advisory Council on Human Rights (CCHR) into a 'National Council for Human Rights (CNDH)', while appointing a former president of the Moroccan Forum for Truth and Justice as the secretary general of the council.
On 9 March 2011, the king himself announced 'comprehensive constitutional reforms', to be approved by a referendum. The next day, the Advisory Committee for the Revision of the Constitution (CCRC) was created and a week later, the institution of 'Ombudsman' was created. Thereafter, a new constitution was drafted and adopted by popular referendum on 1 July 2011. On 25 November of the same year, parliamentary elections were held. A governmental coalition led by the Islamist Justice and Development Party was formed on 3 January 2012, and obtained the confidence of the parliament a few weeks later.
The king's actions left the population still sceptical about the sincerity of his commitment to constitutional and democratic reform. Indeed, the 'royal speech of 9 March 2011 is seen as both a recognition of the M20 movement and as an attempt to cut the grass under its feet.' 23 On the other hand, the speech represented a quest for legitimacy that the Moroccan regime was trying to turn to its advantage. As Bennani-Chraïbi and Jeghllaly noted, 'international reactions were quick: the king is cited by the Western powers, and the European Union expresses its satisfaction with a tangible increase in financial assistance to Morocco.' 24 Beyond financial support, for a regime that is facing a major political crisis, ensuring the political backing of its foreign allies, in this case the EU, is crucial. Indeed, the cases of Egypt and Tunisia demonstrated that the EU eventually sided with the population, against the regimes of Mubarak and Ben Ali, respectively. Visiting Morocco on 7 February 2011, when the political situation was still in turmoil, then-EU Commissioner for Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle declared in the presence of the Moroccan foreign minister: 'It seems to me that we should draw some lessons from what has happened in Tunisia and Egypt. To me, one of the lessons learned is that [...] governments should never underestimate the legitimate aspirations of young people for access to work, liberty of expression and participation in political and civic life of their society.'
25
It is difficult not to see the link between the statement by Commissioner Füle, and the process initiated in Morocco a month later with the king's announcement of political reforms. The EU adopted the role of kingmaker, or at least of key actor, regarding the stability or instability of regimes in the MENA region. We assume that this new posture was successful, allowing the EU to exploit the political context and to turn the situation to its advantage, as discussed further below.
As for Tunisia, in less than a year, between 14 January and 24 December 2011, the country had seen three successive presidents, three prime ministers and four governments. After the election of a National Constituent Assembly on 23 October 2011 and until March 2013, two successive prime ministers led the government, with the first one resigning after the assassination of the leader of an opposition party. Six months later, a second political assassination, targeting the head of another opposition party and member of the Constituent Assembly, plunged the country into a serious political crisis.
On the security front, Tunisia did not experience any respite following these events. An assault on the U.S. Embassy in September 2012 was followed by the assassination of two opposition leaders in February and July 2013, respectively, as mentioned. After July 2013, the process of democratic transition in Tunisia was stalled, with recurrent terrorist attacks punctuating the already fragile political situation in the country. In this highly unstable political environment, and considering the dire economic situation of the country, the government of Tunisia was unlikely to put the management of migration on the top of its political agenda.
How did the European Union react to these major changes in its southern periphery? To be sure, the protest movement starting in December 2010 in Tunisia surprised many, including the EU. After a period of hesitation, and after it decided to back the popular protest movements, Brussels started to produce a number of official documents in response to the new situation. We will mention only the most important for our purposes. 27 was published. Both documents stressed the EU's firm commitment to supporting the aspirations of the people for democracy and change in the southern neighbourhood, presenting this commitment as an obligation deriving from Europe's own experience. While emphasising that the EU 'has to take the clear and strategic option of supporting the quest for the principles and values it cherishes 28 , Brussels' response to the unfolding events consisted in an offer to increase humanitarian assistance, support for democracy and institution-building as well as the promotion of inclusive economic development. 30 It is worth noting that the abovementioned 'New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood' also includes important provisions on migration, listed under the euphemistic heading 'Tackling the challenges of mobility'. These documents were to be followed on 18 November 2011 by another communication entitled 'Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)'.
31
The issue of migration was, and has remained, a major driver of EU policies, sitting somewhat uneasily with the rhetoric of wanting to support democratic change, liberty and dignity in the neighbourhood. In fact, European diplomacy began to be particularly active on migration issues from 26 European Commission, 2011c. 14 February 2011 onwards. Why is this date important? It is significant because it marked the beginning of the exodus of thousands of people fleeing Tunisia and Libya, embarked on makeshift vessels, to reach the coasts of Malta and Italy. This influx provided the EU with the opportunity to put back on the table the issue of readmission, a subject it had been trying to broach for years, but to no avail.
It is worth noting that Barroso's visit to Tunisia took place four months after the departure of Ben Ali, and a little less than two months after the mass migration to Lampedusa, the Italian island off Sicily. During his visit, Barroso addressed the issue of migration, stressing that: 'It is true that 25,000 people is not too much, but considering the small island which has a population of 6,000 people, it can actually be the cause of some concerns. We must understand these concerns. That is why we must work together to prevent this from becoming a problem.' 32 Some would say that this was an inappropriate context in which to seek to address the migration issue, but it is certain that, from the EU's perspective, the timing for pressing for concessions from a weak and vulnerable Tunisian government was certainly ideal.
Tested with some success, from the EU's perspective, with its eastern neighbours, the so-called Mobility Partnerships incorporate cooperation on migration control and readmission, while offering in return some visa facilitation for businesspeople and students, as noted above. Throughout 2011 Throughout , 2012 Throughout and 2013 , the EU stepped up its diplomatic pressure on Tunisia as well as Morocco, cajoling them to sign up to these Mobility Partnerships. Concerning Morocco, EU officials visited Rabat as part of the 'dialogue on migration, mobility and security' on six occasions between October 2011 and early 2013.
33 Two EU official missions are worth mentioning: First, the visit of Commissioner Füle on 7 February 2011, which took place a few days before the radicalization of the popular protests led by the 20 February movement. These demonstrations would prompt King Mohammed VI to announce farreaching reforms a month later, as mentioned above. In all these visits, European representatives reiterated the EU's support to Tunisia. However, they also stressed that this support would be conditional not only on the efforts that Tunisia made in the continuation of the process of democratic transition, but also on its cooperation on migration. This significant EU diplomatic activity was eventually rewarded by the signing of a draft Mobility Partnership document on 18 November 2013.
34
Conditionality, issue-linkage and the EU's strategic use of norms
The new political context described above allowed the EU to advance its strategic interest as regards migration control, which Brussels often associates with security policy. The success in this regard resulted from a review of the EU's approach. Four elements of this new approach stand out: First, a 32 European Commission, 2011g; authors' translation.
33 EU missions took place on 13 October 2011 , 6 December 2011 , 28 May 2012 , 18 and 19 October 2012 , 14 and 15 February 2013 , and 28 February 2013 Interestingly, the Tunisian Ambassador to the EU signed the agreement, not the government. This may raise the question of the extent of effective control exercised by the En-Nahda-led government on Tunisian politics. It may however also indicate that by delegating the signing of the agreement to the ambassador, the Tunisian government sought to 'hide' this highly unpopular measure from public opinion. We are thankful to Jean-Pierre Cassarino for bringing this point to our attention.
conspicuously normative framing of the EU's new policy; second, a reversal of the logic of conditionality; and third, the establishment of a triangular link between democratic reform, cooperation on migration and EU support to its partners. Fourth, and equally important, the EU displayed a new assertiveness in using the new approach, a determining factor in changing the positions of Morocco and Tunisia as regards the EU's migration policy.
The normative framing of EU policies
In its response to the unfolding events in the MENA region, often described as of 'historical proportions', the EU relied on a normative discourse, with extensive references to its own experience and values, as mentioned earlier. For instance, the 'Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity' document states that in the face of demands for greater respect of human rights, the rule of law, and social justice in the MENA region, the EU must embrace the 'quest for the principles and values that it cherishes'. It thus needs to 'support wholeheartedly the wish of the people in our neighbourhood to enjoy the same freedoms that we [the EU] take as our right'. 35 The document goes on to stress that 'European countries have their own experience of democratic transition. The European Union has a proud tradition of supporting countries in transition from autocratic regimes to democracy, first in the South and more recently in Central and Eastern Europe.' 36 Likewise, the 'New Response' document lays out the basis of future relations, stating that '[a]new approach is needed to strengthen the partnership between the EU and the countries and societies of the neighbourhood: to build and consolidate healthy democracies, pursue sustainable economic growth and manage cross-border links.' 37 The 'Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity' document reiterates the normative underpinning of EU policy towards the MENA region. It claims that the EU's new approach 'should be rooted unambiguously in a joint commitment to common values,' and that the 'commitment to democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance and the rule of law must be shared.' The 'Partnership', as the EU terms its policy towards its southern periphery, 'must be based on concrete progress in these areas.' 38 The statements of EU officials quoted above are a further evidence of the EU's normative framing of its new policy. However, a number of principles based on crude realpolitik were to accompany the EU's rhetoric of commitment to democracy and the rule of law.
Reversing the principle of conditionality
The EU's migration policies have traditionally been based on the principle of conditionality. However, this principle seemed to begin to change once the Arab uprising started. Before that date, 'classic' or 'negative' conditionality applied to the EU's migration policy. This meant that the EU supported and provided assistance to third countries, expecting them to respond positively to the request of the EU and its member states to cooperate in preventing unwanted migration to Europe. This cooperation also extended to protection and surveillance of the EU's external borders. The commitments of these third states had to be formalized by the conclusion of readmission agreements and technical arrangements with FRONTEX, the EU's border agency. Brussels could sanction any backtracking by third states by suspending, or at least reducing, cooperation and support. It is important to note that EU support refers to financial aid as well as technical assistance and equipment, both of which had been provided extensively to authoritarian regimes hitherto. However, this approach had a limited impact in encouraging third countries to cooperate proactively in the EU's migration management. Morocco and Tunisia, for instance, profited from EU support to the extent of asking for an ever growing amount of financial aid. Both regimes, however, engaged in making their national legislations on migration more repressive and in legitimising practices that violated human and migrants' rights, while enjoying EU support to maintain their authoritarian regimes in power. 40 The fact that the end of an EU-internal review process of the European Neighbourhood Policy coincided with the beginning of the Arab uprising may have provided the impetus for a shift from a negative conditionality to a positive one. The Communication on 'A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity' of 8 March 2011 expressed the rationale behind this shift, stressing that a 'radically changing political landscape in the Southern Mediterranean requires a change in the EU's approach to the region. confirmed the EU's new approach to conditionality, summarised under the formula 'more for more '. 43 In this new approach, the initiative lies with the partner, while EU support will be tailored accordingly. 44 In other words, it is no longer the EU which takes the initiative to support MENA states and eventually sanction them if they do not cooperate. Rather, it is up to MENA states to take initiatives that correspond to the expectations of the EU. In return, the EU will reward the cooperative 'partners'. In the words of the Commission: 'It is an incentive-based approach based on more differentiation ("more for more"): those that go further and faster with reforms will be able to count on greater support from the EU. Support will be reallocated or refocused for those who stall or retrench on agreed reform plans.' 45 Hence, the new approach was conceived of as a means to create some competition among MENA states. It implicitly entailed a 'race to the top' strategy, trying to set one state's degree of 'cooperation' and the subsequent EU support it obtained as an example to a less compliant one, ultimately setting the bar constantly higher. Significantly, the EU introduced the support for democratic transition as a new element in its conditionality approach, thus forging a triangular relationship between cooperation on migration, progress in the implementation of democratic reforms, and EU support, as discussed in the following.
The triangular link between EU support, democratic reforms and cooperation on migration
In addition to the inversion of the logic of conditionality, the EU's new approach operates by conditioning its support on the continuation of democratic reforms in third countries and on their effective engagement on migration management. Thus, while the EU declared its objective as being to help the building and consolidating of 'healthy democracies' in its neighbourhood, 46 it also specified that its resources should be used according to its policy objectives towards the South. Recalling the 39 Council of the European Union, 2012: 11. 40 For Tunisia see for example Cassarino, 2014. JHA Council Conclusions of 9 and 10 June 2001, the Council stressed that 'the EU will consider to launch, on a case by case basis, readmission and visa facilitation agreements with Southern partners and EU engagement will depend inter alia on effective cooperation against illegal migration including on readmission and border management.' 47 Thus, under the new EU approach, the EU will support partners who are committed to strengthening democracy and human rights, but they are expected to simultaneously undertake effective actions to meet the EU's objectives in terms of readmission and border management. From his side, Barroso expressed this idea in simple and direct terms: 'I made it very clear to our Tunisian friends that we want to develop our relations with Tunisia in all directions, economic, political, but that of course, resolving the problems of immigration is essential for deepening these relations.'
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Never before has the EU brought all these elements, i.e. democratic reforms, commitment to addressing migration issues and financial support, under one roof in its relations with the MENA countries.
49 Through this new issue-linkage, the EU attains three objectives at once. First, it allows it to counter allegations that the EU is obsessed with security considerations, readmission agreements and the fight against unauthorized immigration, at the expense of human rights and the rights of migrants. By stipulating that it would suspend cooperation and financial support because of a lack of democratic reform and an insufficient protection of migrant rights in third countries, the EU could demonstrate that now it aimed at ensuring that cooperation on readmission is conducted according to international human rights standards.
Second, the new linkage effectively counters reservations, or an outright refusal, to cooperate with the EU on readmission by third countries because of possible human rights violations. Indeed, thenTunisian Secretary of State for migration had pointed out that civil society activists objected to the signing of a Mobility Partnership, given that readmission and border management might seriously violate the rights of migrants. 50 However, it is important to recall the fact that both parties have been using human and migrant rights as a negotiating tool to attain their respective goals 51 Hence, the EU's commitment to provide technical and financial support to back up democratic reforms, which would also ensure the legal protection of the rights of migrants and asylum seekers, confronts Moroccan and Tunisian authorities with their own contradictions: if Rabat and Tunis were sincere in their commitments to democracy, and if reforms were put in place, arguments based on possible human rights violations would become irrelevant. If, however, the announced reforms were not implemented, the Moroccan and Tunisian regimes alone would bear the responsibility for this failure.
Finally, the new issue-linkage allows the EU to exert a greater political pressure on third countries to sign up for a Mobility Partnership, including cooperation on readmission and border control. According to the new strategy, the EU would 'punish' recalcitrant partners, by reviewing its cooperation policy and freezing financial support. It may potentially also support the political opposition, such as civil society organisations or political parties, which are calling for democratic change. Hence, in case that the EU decided to suspend or revise its assistance to the regimes in place, this would be interpreted as an accusation against these governments or regimes, suggesting that they are not inclined to turn the page of authoritarianism. In other words, the EU's (rhetorical) commitment to democracy, under the guise of which the Union assigned itself the right to be in direct contact with political parties and civil society actors in Morocco and Tunisia, may ultimately represent a threat to the stability and legitimacy of these regimes. In a period of political transition and potential popular discontent with the performance of regimes, this aspect is significant, particularly considering the 47 Council of the European Union, 2011: 4. 48 European Commission, 2011g; authors' translation. 49 This linkage existed in the EU's policy towards the eastern neighbourhood, however. 50 Jaziri, 2013. 51 Wolff, 2014: 82-83. EU's self-attributed reputation of being an expert on democratic transitions. Obviously, this strategy would not have been possible if the political context in these countries was different, as is the case in reform-resistant Algeria, for instance.
The Moroccan and Tunisian regimes are still in a critical and vulnerable political phase. Morocco, for instance, is a long way from overcoming the challenges of the Arab uprisings. As Eric Goldstein and Ahmed Benchemsi noted in 2013, '[i]t would be a mistake […] to accept the narrative that Morocco has inured itself from social upheaval by embracing meaningful reform. Street protests have not coalesced into a mass movement, partly because the opposition is weak and fragmented. But week after week, local demonstrations against injustice, unemployment, and repression occur in towns and cities across the country, and often degenerate into stone-throwing, property damage, and police crackdowns. Such incidents were rare a decade ago; they now erupt every few weeks, with increasing levels of violence. This is contributing to a potential instability that threatens the kingdom's "Arab exception" narrative.'
52 As for Tunisia, the political transition process is no less fragile, as noted above, with its first years witnessing repeated demonstrations, political assassinations and a growing number of terrorist attacks, partly linked to the increase in violence along the Algerian border, the growth of radical Islamist groups in the Middle East and North Africa, and the unstable situation in neighbouring Libya.
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Under these conditions, Morocco and Tunisia had a clear interest in ensuring the EU's support, even if it was made conditional on their cooperation on migration. And unlike previously, when the EU's terms of conditionality had been a toothless threat, this time the EU also demonstrated a new assertiveness in acting, or threatening to act, on its conditionality principle, as the next section will highlight.
Acting upon the new conditionality principle
A new assertiveness in threatening to suspend aid is a further key element of the EU's approach towards Morocco and Tunisia post-Arab uprisings. As for Morocco, the EU initially expressed its satisfaction with the far-reaching reforms announced by Mohamed VI, underlining its willingness to assist the Moroccan authorities in implementing them. But Brussels also made it clear that these reforms had to be actually carried out, and that all sectors of Morocco's political landscape and civil society had to be involved. 54 However, implementing the reforms took much longer than expected, and there were no indications that the regime had decided to give up its authoritarian practices. The recalcitrance of the Moroccan regime could of course be explained by its experience with the European Union in the past, which had taught Rabat that the EU's rhetorical commitment to democratic reforms and human rights in MENA states did not deserve much credence. In addition, in the face of the new political context it initially remained difficult to decipher the degree of the EU's actual commitment to democratic reform and the respect for human rights in the MENA region.
The EU reiterated on several occasions the logic of its new approach. Brussels stressed that 'only those partners willing to embark on political reforms and to respect the shared universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law have been offered the most rewarding aspects of the EU policy, notably economic integration (based on the establishment of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas -DCFTAs), mobility of people (mobility partnerships), as well as greater EU financial assistance'. 55 This point was repeatedly and bluntly made to the Moroccan counterparts. For instance, in a meeting organised by the Commission with the Moroccan media in January 2013 in Brussels, 52 Goldstein and Benchemsi, 2013. 53 International Crisis Group, 2014. Thomas Feige, head of the Maghreb division at the DG for Development Cooperation (DevCo), explained to Moroccan journalists that within the EU's objective of improving the democratic transition process in the country, 'funds will no longer be granted ... (and) ... will be injected only depending on the results of reforms.' 56 One month later, Eneko Landaburu, Ambassador and Head of the EU's Delegation to Morocco, made a similar point during an interview with a Moroccan online journal: 'The more a country will make efforts to deepen its democratic quality in the future, the easier it will be for it to receive political and financial support from Europe. This also means that whoever made the least effort will receive less.' 57 Asked about the reasons for why the EU had blocked large sums in support of judicial reforms in Morocco, Landaburu stressed that the Moroccan authorities had not presented a concrete reform plan or strategy. Thus, he repeated to the journalists what he had told the Moroccan minister of justice: 'Minister, when you have finalised a comprehensive reform […], I'll be at your disposal so that we can evoke the terms of the EU's support.' 58 The EU's new assertiveness on the conditionality principle must also be seen in the context of the relatively high number of official EU visits to Morocco, aimed at discussing the Mobility Partnership that had been under negotiation since October 2011 within the bilateral dialogue on migration, mobility and security. Within this framework, EU officials had visited Rabat on 18 and 19 October 2012 and on 14 and 15 February 2013. The last meeting took place on 28 February 2013. The day after, the Mobility Partnership was initialled; it was eventually signed on 7 June 2013. It is difficult not to see a direct correlation between the positions expressed by the EU Ambassador regarding the suspension of financial aid and political support on the one hand and the formal acceptance by Morocco of the Mobility Partnership on the other hand.
As for Tunisia, Commissioners Füle and Malmström presented the EU's new approach on their visit to Tunisia on 31 March, 2011. Focusing on democratic reforms and human rights issues, Füle stated: 'Tunisia wants to become a stable democracy, which fully respects fundamental rights and freedoms. It aims to organise free, fair and transparent elections. It wants to launch deep reforms to fight corruption and ensure the independence of the judiciary, guarantee liberty of expression and association. These changes are historic for Tunisia. Europe is ready to support Tunisia in each of these fundamental reforms.' 59 However, Füle also pointed out that '[i]t is too early to talk of future amounts. They depend on the specific reforms that Tunisia will ask for our support to.' Significantly, from her side, Cecilia Malmström, the Commissioner in charge of migration, underlined that 'this visit is an immediate follow-up to the request by the European Council to explore the possibility of enhancing people-to-people contacts and of working together with the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood region to better manage migration and mobility.' 60 Ten days later, then-President of the European Commission Barroso went further in explaining Füle's and Malmström's message to the Tunisian authorities during his visit to Tunis. Stating that while the EU would provide 'support for democratic transition', Barroso expected from Tunisia a 'strong and clear action in accepting the readmission […] and in fighting against irregular migration.' Finally, he reminded the Tunisian government of the new model of conditionality by emphasizing that '[t]he commitment of Tunisia is crucial for the continuation of our cooperation. Europe is ready to assist you with additional resources, but we also need Tunisian authorities to be more involved.' 61 56 TelQuel, 2013, authors' translation. 57 Landaburu quoted in Guguen, 2013. 58 Ibid., authors' translation. 59 European Commission, 2011h. 60 Ibid. 61 European Commission, 2011d.
On his fourth visit to Tunisia on 15 March 2013, Füle seemed impatient with the Tunisian authorities for not having made greater efforts to push ahead the transition process. According to the Commissioner, 'in the last few months the positive momentum has slowed down. We are concerned that the worsening political climate and increased polarization could derail the reform process. This might lead to instability and violence. That is certainly not what people of this country want and deserve.' 62 However, he also stressed that 'the European Union will continue to support Tunisia in its reforms. It is willing to discuss with all partners (politicians, civil society, and entrepreneurs) how best to adapt our assistance to the specific needs of Tunisia '. 63 It is worth noting that the then-Tunisian interim government under Beji Caïd Essebsi had agreed to establish a dialogue on migration, mobility and security with the EU in October 2011. Unsurprisingly, the elections of the Constituent Assembly in late October 2011 and the subsequent constitutionmaking process were Tunisia's main preoccupation in that period, with the dialogue on migration moving to the backburner.
While the EU's limited understanding of the difficulties related to the transitional period in Tunisia seems surprising, the slow pace of democratic reforms was apparently not the only, or perhaps not the principal concern of Commissioner Füle. Indeed, the Commissioner was quick to recall Brussels' proposal to launch negotiations on a Mobility Partnership 'which will improve the mobility of people. We have just agreed on a mobility partnership with Morocco and encourage our Tunisian friends and partners to rapidly follow this example for the benefit of the citizens of Tunisia.' 64 This statement exemplifies the new issue-linkage, that is, the triangular relationship between EU support, the continuation of democratic reforms of MENA states, and their commitment to cooperate with Brussels on migration. The reference to the willingness of neighbouring Morocco to initial the text of the Mobility Partnership does not seem to be fortuitous, as it was likely to have increased the pressure on the Tunisian authorities to sign up to a Mobility Partnership themselves. In December 2012 Tunisia agreed to discuss the opening of negotiations on the Mobility Partnership; negotiations were finalized in November 2013.
During the evaluation of the implementation of the new Neighbourhood Policy in May 2012, Štefan Füle called on the EU not to 'indulge in self-congratulation', stressing the need to always make 'a reality check about the effectiveness of our policy'. However, he also stressed that 'we have set the new policy on solid grounds and have developed many initiatives that I am confident are already bearing fruit'. 65 In hindsight, this statement sounds prophetic. It seems indeed to announce both the agreement by MENA states to negotiate agreements with the EU on the readmission of both nationals and non-national migrants, and the fact that FRONTEX would become a key partner in managing migration from the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Hence, while Brussels' 'new commitment to democratic reforms' represents a novelty in EU foreign policy, the effectiveness of this commitment needs to be questioned. Morocco has been accused of other human rights abuses as well. For instance, in October 2013 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning Morocco because of the dire human rights situation in the Western Sahara. 68 The violation of the Saharawis' rights, however, did not prevent Brussels from negotiating with Morocco on a fisheries agreement in 2011 that included the disputed territory of the Western Sahara: an agreement the territorial scope of which the European Parliament's Legal Service denounced as a violation of international law. 69 Landaburu, the same EU Ambassador to Morocco who did not cease to stress the necessity of implementing reforms to ensure respect for human rights, laconically noted on this matter: 'I am sure that a number of MEPs who are supporting the position of the Polisario will question the legitimacy of this agreement because it will allow fishing within the disputed area. But, I think they are not numerous enough to win the vote. […] [They] will say what they have to say, and then there will be a vote.' 70 Moreover, the arrest of journalist Ali Anouzla and his subsequent indictment on charges of 'inciting' and 'providing material support' to terrorism, together with the growing repression faced by pro-democracy activists and other journalists, show how the Moroccan regime continues the repressive policy of the makhzen.
The EU's commitment to democracy
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In Tunisia, neither the political crisis, the campaign of intimidation against journalists, the serious damage to the independence of the judiciary, the three political assassinations, the terrorist attacks nor the poisonous atmosphere that marked the country in the aftermath of the Jasmine revolution stopped the EU from exerting exceptionally strong pressure on Tunisian authorities to sign the Mobility Partnership draft at the end of 2013. In Brussels, representatives of intergovernmental organizations as well as Tunisian officials were dismayed by the EU's obsession with obtaining a Mobility Partnership agreement, including readmission commitments, while it ignored the repeated requests for financial support that the Tunisian authorities had put forward.
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Against this backdrop, the EU commitment to democracy and respect for human rights seems to be little more than a powerful rhetorical tool. Significantly, this tool is used in a strategic manner to achieve the EU's objectives, namely the cooperation of MENA states in the prevention of unwanted migration to Europe, while it allows the EU to reaffirm its (allegedly) normative identity. In December 2013, the European Parliament approved a renewed EU-Moroccan fisheries agreement, which, according to critics, does still not respect international law provisions, does not exclude the waters of the Western Sahara coast, and did not consult the Sahrawi population in the negotiation process. 70 Landaburu quoted in Guguen, 2013 ; authors' translation. Landaburu subscribes to the legal analysis according to which an authority which administers a territory may exploit a certain amount of resources and goods as long as it has a positive effect on the population. 71 Anouzla was arrested in late 2013 after a web site he helped to found published an article on an al-Qaeda video that attacked the King for presiding over a 'kingdom of corruption and despotism' and called for jihad against him. Anouzla did not post the video, but his article featured a screen shot and a link to the web site of the Spanish newspaper El País, which carried a link to the video. See Alami, 2014 ; see also Laabidi, 2013. 72 Interviews conducted in Brussels, March 2013.
Conclusions
This paper has analysed the EU's strategy aimed at co-opting Morocco and Tunisia into its model of migration governance and control post-Arab uprisings. The EU would not have achieved its objective without adapting its strategy to the concrete situation of political vulnerability and instability in Morocco and Tunisia. The case of the EU's Mobility Partnership with Morocco and Tunisia thus highlights the fact that strategies can only have any meaning in a situated context. It is indeed difficult to conceive of the relationship between the EU and these MENA states without considering the specific political context of the interaction. The fact that the EU did not exert the same pressure on Algeria, where it did not even try to propose the negotiation of a Mobility Partnership, confirms this observation. In this specific situation, the EU reassembled the components of its foreign policy. It engaged in normatively framed politics in support of democratisation in Morocco and Tunisia, linking this commitment, however, to an interest-driven conditionality, aimed not only at ensuring reforms, but also at pressuring these states into cooperating with the EU's migration management.
The case under consideration, however, also demonstrates that while taking advantage of the political situation created by the Arab uprisings, the EU's normatively framed response served to legitimize an extremely self-interested policy on the side of the Union. With EU values constituting the EU's international identity, the case of the EU's Mobility Partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia thus sheds light on one specific way in which interests and identity interlock in EU foreign policy. Challenging an altruistic and slightly naïve interpretation of the normative power Europe concept, our analysis adds to the persistent debate in EU studies literature on the nature and international role of the European Union. While confirming that the EU can be both normative and realist at the same time, the discussion provides a clear example of a strategic use of norms in EU foreign policy. It also provides a concrete example of how these specific EU policies affect Morocco and Tunisia.
However, if the EU's new modus operandi has been successful in changing the position of Rabat and Tunis on migration control, the question remains as to the extent to which the EU's normatively framed response to the Arab uprisings was instrumental in this. It is difficult to assess whether the new linkage between democratic reform and EU assistance derives from a genuine conviction that democratic values in the periphery must be promoted and defended, or whether EU support for democratisation in the periphery was merely used as a leverage to ensure that Morocco and Tunisia would accept the mode of the EU's migration management. While the EU and its member states can safely be assumed to embrace democratic transitions wherever they take place, the Union's continuing cooperation with reform-resistant states in the MENA region, such as Morocco, Algeria, or Jordan, seems to indicate that in the EU's list of priorities, human rights and democratic values are secondary to the periphery's stability. 73 The EU Ambassador to Morocco put it succinctly by declaring:
'Listen, it would be better to get rid of the idea that the EU must be the teacher of politics or of human rights. We are in a state-to-state relationship. We are not an NGO. We have interests to defend and practices to be respected. Yet, when we see that the red line in relation to commitments that have been taken has been crossed, we intervene. For instance, I denounced the slow pace of justice reform; I commented on the state of prisons; I talked about the situation of migrants in this country. But, I 'm not here to be the teacher who gives lessons.' 74 73 Del Sarto, 2015. 74 Landaburu quoted in Guguen, 2013; authors' translation. 
